Eugenio Porta
Sitting at the crossroads of great power interests, bordering on Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan or Türkiye, and having last been subjected to an invasion in 2023, Armenia nevertheless no longer seeks protectiion alone, but strategic relevance. Incumbent Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan, currently seeking to garner a parliamentary majority in elections this Sunday, is attempting to turn geopolitical vulnerability into strategic autonomy by investing in infrastructure, regional interconnections and more cooperative relations with historically difficult neighbours.
“Riding through the Storm”, the motto of the Yerevan Dialogue, an annual conference that took place in May immediately after the European Political Community (EPC) summit this year, is not just a slogan, but a reality Armenia has lived through over the duration of its history as one of the oldest civilisations. As Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan put it, “Armenia knows what it means to be in the centre of the storm.” He described three of his country’s traditional responses to geopolitical turbulence: detachment, surrender, or the attempt to “ride through the storm with pragmatism and forward-looking strategy.”
This language resonates deeply in Armenia, a country whose political imagination is shaped by a long history of survival at the crossroads of empires. Despite repeated conquest, displacement and genocide, Armenia preserved a distinct language, alphabet, church and cultural identity — elements that continue to inform its understanding of sovereignty today.
The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh marked a turning point for Armenia. Azerbaijan’s military offensive in 2023, combined with Russia’s limited response despite its traditional alliance with Yerevan, deeply weakened Armenian trust in Moscow as a reliable security guarantor. In the aftermath of the conflict, Armenia increasingly began searching for new diplomatic, economic and strategic partnerships capable of reducing its isolation and dependence on Russia.
This year has already brought the first concrete signs of diplomatic momentum. Within the span of a single week, Yerevan hosted the European Political Community (EPC) summit on 4 May, the EU-Armenia Summit on 4–5 May, and the Yerevan Dialogue on 5–6 May, bringing together European leaders, diplomats, policymakers and experts to discuss regional security, connectivity and the future of the South Caucasus.
The EU-Armenia Summit confirmed the growing political convergence between Armenia and the European Union. The Connectivity Partnership, the new investment package and enhanced security cooperation confirmed Brussels’ intention to anchor Armenia more deeply within the European political and economic sphere. Beyond supporting democratic reforms, the EU also has a broader interest in strengthening its presence in the South Caucasus at a time when Russian influence appears increasingly contested and the region is becoming strategically significant for trade, energy and transport diversification.
The EU has also established a new EU Partnership Mission in Armenia under the Common Security and Defence Policy, designed to strengthen the country’s democratic resilience and capacity to respond to hybrid threats, including disinformation, cyber-attacks and illicit financial flows. The mission reflects a broader European effort to support partners exposed to geopolitical pressure, drawing on similar resilience-oriented tools already used in Moldova.
One of the most ambitious projects discussed during the forum was the TRIPP initiative. If implemented, this US-backed regional connectivity proposal would connect Armenia with Azerbaijan and Türkiye through railways, roads, pipelines, electricity infrastructure and optical fibre networks. For Armenia, the project could reduce transport costs, expand trade routes, attract infrastructure investment and gradually decrease economic dependence on Russia, while also raising Washington’s profile in the region.
However, the project remains highly political and its implementation depends on several unresolved issues, including Armenian-Azerbaijani normalisation, border management, regional security guarantees and the long-term economic sustainability of the proposed routes. Whether TRIPP will ultimately become a transformative economic corridor or remain primarily a geopolitical vision is still uncertain.
Yet Armenia’s strategic diversification should not be mistaken for a complete geopolitical realignment. Armenian officials repeatedly stressed that Yerevan’s objective is not to sever ties with Russia, but to expand the country’s diplomatic, economic and security options. This caution reflects the fact that Armenia remains deeply dependent on Russia in several key areas, including energy, trade, labour migration, security arrangements and military infrastructure. As Yerevan strengthens its ties with the European Union, it must therefore proceed carefully, seeking greater autonomy without triggering a destabilising confrontation with Moscow.
Another fundamental goal is to normalise relations with countries with which Armenia has long-standing disputes. Some results are already tangible. During the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, Türkiye closed its land border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan, its close ally. The reopening of dialogue channels, the resumption of direct flights and recent steps toward easing trade restrictions therefore represent a meaningful shift, even if full normalisation remains distant. At the same time, relations with Azerbaijan are moving cautiously toward normalisation. After decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the two sides announced in March 2025 that they had agreed on the text of a peace agreement, later initialled in Washington in August 2025. Yet the agreement still requires formal signature, ratification and implementation. Key unresolved issues remain, including border delimitation, the opening and governance of transport links, and Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia amend constitutional references which Baku interprets as territorial claims. Still, limited trade-related exchanges have begun to appear, suggesting that normalisation is slowly producing practical, if still fragile, effects.
On several occasions, Armenian representatives, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed strong interest in the country joining the European Union. However, despite the good intentions and the significant steps already taken, European integration remains a gradual and uncertain process. The strong influence Moscow still has on Yerevan, a country historically embedded within Russia’s political, economic and security orbit, remains a structural challenge for deeper European integration. In fact, what Armenia is claiming now is sovereignty: like many post-Soviet societies, Armenia views sovereignty not as an abstract principle, but as a historical question tied to security, autonomy and national survival. Many Armenians see EU integration as a path toward freedom of mobility, diversification and institutional stability. Yet accession remains a long-term prospect, constrained by geography, unresolved regional disputes and Armenia’s structural economic dependence on Russia.
In this sense, the country is no longer attempting merely to survive geopolitical competition, but to shape its position within it. Armenia’s strategy today is not built on choosing one geopolitical camp over another, but on multiplying its strategic options.
Today, as in the past, the South Caucasus is an arena of competition among powerful global and regional actors, including Russia, Türkiye, Iran and China. For some time, Brussels tended to view the region mainly through the lens of the Eastern Partnership and future European integration, particularly when Georgia appeared firmly on an EU-oriented track. Today, while Azerbaijan and Georgia hedge among competing external actors and avoid unilateral alignment, Armenia is attempting something more ambitious: to seek sovereignty through connectivity, diversification and geopolitical relevance, while maximising its domestic benefits by engaging all relevant actors interested in increasing their footprint in the region and avoiding toxic dependencies.
Under such difficult circumstances, Armenia’s choice for strategic orientation— increasingly anchored in cooperation with the European Union, while still managing a complex web of diverse regional and American interests — can serve as a laboratory for both the EU and other countries attempting a similar balancing act.
Its success will mainly be tested by the upcoming parliamentary elections of June 7, which will therefore be a crucial test for Pashinyan’s government, especially in a context marked by Russian propaganda. On the latter, again Yerevan is struggling to resist the Moscow electoral interference machine with help from Brussels, which has provided a hybrid rapid response team ahead of elections to that end.
