February 2024
On January 10th, 2024, Romanian farmers and hauliers engaged in a nationwide protest against the government’s transport and agricultural policies, briefly blocking traffic at border crossings and several cities, including the frontier with Ukraine and the capital’s ring road.
February
2024
Since the beginning of the second invasion of Ukraine, the far-right and pro-Russian AUR party, led by George Simion, has had difficulties reconciling its support for conservative Russia with the critical attitude towards Russia held by most Romanians, including nationalists[1]. As we have shown in several Global Focus reports, AUR reacted to this challenge by trying to minimize the number of pro-Russian positions and maximize the number of anti-Ukrainian positions. But as the party stabilized in the polls at around 20%, its constituency expanded to include more of those who are motivated by disappointment with the current situation in Romania rather than by radical ideological positions. This expanded constituency does not necessarily share in AUR’s hostility towards Ukraine, ethnic and religious minorities etc.
2024 marks the biggest electoral year yet for Romania, with European, local, parliamentary and presidential polls scheduled to take place on the background of significant domestic and global challenges, with the potential to further destabilise and polarise society. The rise of far-right and right-wing populists, correlated with a surge of disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war, has reached an otherwise politically overlooked segment of the population – young people. Feeling unrepresented and severed from the political discourse, Romanian youth is at significant risk of radicalisation, being particularly vulnerable to extremist voices that aim to capitalise on their frustrations and disengagement, while leveraging their preferred channels of information and communication with increasing efficiency. Social media and youth susceptibility to online echo chambers and influencers provide pathway for manipulation by malicious actors whose political agenda aligns – more often than not – with the Kremlin’s (anti-EU, anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine, pro-Russia).
Despite the rise of TikTok and discussions about “freer” platforms such as MeWe or Telegram, Facebook remains the main platform for political debates in Romania. Facebook is also the platform for initiating radicalization. Radical channels on Facebook work to attract people with moderate opinions or those who are not politically socialized online, radicalize them, and then try to transfer them to other platforms.
In this – apparently favourable – environment, Diana Șoșoacă, far-right MP and outspoken Kremlin supporter, has experienced a spectacular drop in audience, from 22 million monthly views to mere thousands in just a few months.
Ever since the beginning of the war, the far right has had to appease two constituencies. The more traditional far right had been historically opposed to Russia’s foreign policy: anti-communism and by extension opposition to Russia is the founding myth of the Romanian far-right. This goes way back to Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, leader of the interwar fascist movement The Iron Guard and Ion Antonescu, interwar prime-minister allied with Hitler. The far-right will often justify their deeds (including hate and war crimes) by the need to resist Soviet / Russian influence. Also, the vast majority of Romanians do not sympathise with Russia[1] so every effort to recruit followers from the mainstream needs to account for that.
